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THE PROBLEM OF SINGLING OUT RELIGION
Michael W. McConnell*
INTRODUCTION
From the earliest days of the Republic, Americans have been debat-
ing whether the principle of free exercise entitles religious institutions
or religiously motivated individuals to exemptions from generally ap-
plicable laws, or to other accommodations in order to alleviate the
occasional conflict between the demands of faith and the demands of
the state. The principal ground for the debate has been institutional:
whether decisions about religious accommodation ought to be made
by courts as a matter of constitutional right, or by legislatures as a
matter of political discretion. During the drafting of the Bill of Rights
by the First Congress, for example, the House of Representatives
adopted, but the Senate rejected, James Madison's proposal to exempt
those "religiously scrupulous of bearing arms" from compulsory mili-
tia service.1 Proponents stated that such a provision was necessary to
"show the world that proper care is taken that the government may
not interfere with the religious sentiments of any person. '2 The princi-
pal ground of opposition was not that religious exemptions are unwar-
ranted, but that the matter ought to be "left to the discretion of the
Government."' 3 Similarly, in early litigation under state constitutional
equivalents of the Free Exercise Clause, 4 two courts interpreted their
provisions as protecting religious claimants from the operation of gen-
erally applicable law (in cases involving priest-penitent confidential-
ity), 5 while two other courts rejected such an interpretation. 6 The
latter courts concluded that requests for religious accommodation
* Presidential Professor, University of Utah College of Law.
1. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 173, 176 (Neil Cogan ed., 1997).
2. Id. at 190 (Mr. Boudinot).
3. Id. at 187 (Mr. Benson).
4. There was no litigation over the Free Exercise Clause in the early decades of the Republic.
The first such case, Permoli v. New Orleans, 44 U.S. 589 (1845), held only that the First Amend-
ment did not apply to the states.
5. People v. Philips, Court of General Sessions, City of New York (June 14, 1813), published
in WILLIAM SAMPSON, THE CATHOLIC QuEsTION IN AMERICA (1813 and photo reprint t974),
excerpted in Privileged Communications to Clergymen, 1 CATH. LAW. 199, 199-209 (1955): Com-
monwealth v. Cronin, 1 Q. L. J. 128 (Va. Richmond Cir. Ct. 1856).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
raise "considerations of policy" that should be addressed to the
legislature. 7
The United States Supreme Court has experienced the same ten-
sion between providing constitutional protection for religious exercise
and deferring to the judgments of politically accountable institutions.
In its 1990 decision overruling the prior doctrine of constitutional free
exercise exemptions, Employment Division v. Smith,8 the Court ex-
plained that religious accommodation, however desirable, must be left
to the legislature: "to say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice
exemption is permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to say that it
is constitutionally required." 9 As the author of the Smith opinion
stated in a subsequent case, the question posed by the Free Exercise
cases "is, quite simply, whether the people, through their elected rep-
resentatives, or rather this Court, shall control the outcome of those
... cases."10 Recently, Professor Eugene Volokh has made the inter-
esting suggestion that religious exemptions should be decided on a
"common law" model, in which decisions about specific conflicts are
initially made by courts, subject to legislative revision.1
Each of these approaches presuppose that exemptions for religious
activity are legitimate; the debate is over whether they should be con-
stitutionally required. As the question of religious accommodation has
returned to national and state legislatures, some commentators have
posed a more radical question: not which institution should be vested
with the responsibility of determining the balance between the exer-
cise of religion and enforcement of the law, but whether it is legiti-
mate for any body to exempt those engaged in the practice of religion
from the regulatory burdens imposed on others. Opponents argue that
to exempt individuals or institutions from generally applicable laws on
the basis of religious objection, while leaving similarly situated indi-
viduals or institutions with secular objections to the law without a
remedy, amounts to an unconstitutional "privileging" of religion over
nonreligion, in violation of the Establishment Clause. 12
6. Simon's Executors v. Gratz, 2 Pen. & W. 412 (Pa. 1831); State v. Willson, 13 S.C.L. (2
McCord) 393 (1823). See also Commonwealth v. Drake, 15 Mass. 161 (1818) (rejecting claim for
free exercise exemption on the facts).
7. Simon's Executors, 2 Pen. & W. at 414.
8. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
9. Id. at 890.
10. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 544 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).
11. Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV.
1465 (1999). He suggests that this could be authorized by statute.
12. See, e.g., Frederick M. Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable Indefensibility of
Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LrIrI.E ROCK L. REV. 555 (1998); Stephen Gey, Why Is Relig-
ion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion under the Religion Clauses of the
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My thesis is that "singling out religion" for special constitutional
protection is fully consistent with our constitutional tradition. In fact,
it is virtually impossible to understand our tradition of the separation
of church and state without recognizing that religion raises political
and constitutional issues not raised by other institutions or ideologies.
For this reason, the First Amendment contains a special provision
governing the rights of free exercise and nonestablishment of religion:
precisely because there are special constitutional rules applicable to
religion.
This statement does not require that religion must always be treated
differently. Obviously, there are many contexts in which the best
means of ensuring that government may not control or direct religious
practice is to require equal treatment of religion. 13 My thesis, rather, is
that "religion-blindness" should not be treated as a general, or con-
trolling, interpretation of the First Amendment. "Religion-blindness"
is a tool, to be evaluated in particular cases according to the ultimate
purposes of the Religion Clauses, to ensure that religion, as nearly as
possible, is free from government control or influence, whether
favorable or unfavorable. We ought to be discussing not whether re-
ligion should be "singled out," but how, when, and why it should be
"singled out."
II. RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS: CURRENT LAW AND THE CRITIQUE
Religion-specific exemptions are relatively common in our law,
even after Smith. As a matter of constitutional rights, Smith left intact
the requirement of strict scrutiny for laws burdening religious exercise
in two contexts: where the burden is imposed on a case-by-case basis
rather than pursuant to a generally applicable law, 14 and where the
burden to religious exercise is combined with a burden to some other
constitutional right.15 Either category, if generously interpreted, could
prove to be a substantial exception to the Smith rule. The first situa-
tion is easily satisfied because few statutes are genuinely applicable
across the board, without exceptions and without consideration of in-
dividual cases. The second category is also easily overcome since any
creative lawyer should be able to properly allege a burden (only a
First Amendment, 52 U. PITr. L. REV. 75 (1990); William Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free
Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. Ciii. L. REV. 308 (1991); Suzanna Sherry, Lee v. Weisman: Paradox
Redux, 1992 Sup. CT. REV. 123.
13. See EQUAL TREATMENT OF RELIGION IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY (Stephen V. Monsma,
eds., 1998).
14. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
15. Id. at 881-82.
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burden and not an actual violation needs to be shown) on another
constitutional right, such as property, speech, privacy, or association,
in addition to the free exercise claim. In addition, Smith reaffirmed
two specific categories of free exercise claims that have produced
many cases regarding the internal governance of churches,1 6 and
claims for unemployment compensation.' 7 The latter are especially
controversial because the baseline for determining benefits and bur-
dens is highly ambiguous. 8 The unemployment cases hold that a
worker who loses his or her job for religious reasons is constitutionally
entitled to unemployment compensation, while workers who lose jobs
for other important, but non-religious, reasons are not entitled to such
compensation. The theory behind this rule is that when a state grants
unemployment compensation to a worker who quits the job for "good
cause," it is unconstitutional to refuse to recognize sincere religious
reasons as "good cause." Under this doctrine, a worker who cannot
work on Saturday for religious reasons is entitled to compensation,
but not a worker who cannot work on Saturday in order to care for
dependants. A worker who cannot work on armaments because of a
religious objection to participation in war is entitled to compensation,
but not a worker who quits because of powerful environmental objec-
tions to her employer's practices.
Aside from constitutional exemptions, there are statutes at the state
and federal level designed to provide exemptions or accommodations
to laws that burden religious exercise without a sufficient justification.
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 9 is the most promi-
nent of such statutes. Although the RFRA was invalidated by the Su-
preme Court as applied to state and local governments,20 it continues
to apply to federal governmental action.2' The recently enacted Relig-
16. Id. at 877.
17. Id. at 884.
18. In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). the Supreme Court held that a Saturday sabba-
tarian who lost her job when her employer, a textile manufacturing plant, assigned her to work
on Saturday could not be denied unemployment compensation. The Court theorized that a de-
nial of compensation would, in effect, penalize her for exercise of a constitutional right:
The ruling forces her to choose between following the precepts of her religion and
forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion
in order to accept work, on the other hand. Governmental imposition of such a choice
puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed
against appellant for her Saturday worship.
Id. at 404. While the result in Sherbert is defensible, it is far from clear that the Court's rationale
is correct. See Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of
Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHi. L. REV. 1, 35-45 (1989).
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (1994).
20. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
21. In re Young, 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998).
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ious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 22 provides protection
for religious exercise threatened by land use and prison regulations. A
number of states have enacted "state RFRAs, '' 23 and some state con-
stitutions have been interpreted to provide similar protection. 24 Under
each of these enactments, burdens on religious exercise are subjected
to independent judicial scrutiny that is not given to burdens on secular
interests.
Even more common are statutes providing special treatment for re-
ligious concerns within the context of specific statutory schemes. A
recent survey of federal and state law revealed that the terms "relig-
ion" or "religious" appear over 14,000 times, and religious exemptions
appear in over 2,000 statutes.2 5 The study elaborated:
In the United States Code, for example, exemptions exist in food
inspection laws for the ritual slaughter of animals, and for the prep-
aration of food in accordance with religious practices. The tax laws
contain numerous exemptions for religious groups and allow deduc-
tions for contributions to religious organizations. Federal copyright
laws contain an exemption for materials that are to be used for re-
ligious purposes. Antidiscrimination laws, including Title VII, the
Fair Housing Act, and the Aid to the Disabled Act, contain exemp-
tions for religious organizations. Ministers are automatically exempt
from compulsory military training and service. Aliens seeking asy-
lum can do so on the grounds that they will suffer religious persecu-
tion if returned to their home countries and gambling laws contain
an exemption for religious organizations. Those in the military may
wear religious apparel while wearing their uniforms, subject to limi-
tations imposed by the Secretary of Defense. And last, but certainly
not least for purposes of this Note, federal drug laws contain an
exemption for the religious use of peyote by members of the Native
American Church.26
Even before Smith, legislative accommodations were far more impor-
tant to the protection of religious exercise than the First Amendment.
This fact is even more true today.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that religious accommoda-
tions are constitutionally permissible, even if not constitutionally re-
22. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, (106
Stat. 2869).
23. See Volokh, supra note 11; Alan E. Brownstein, State RFRA Statutes and Freedom of
Speech, 32 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 605 (1999).
24. See Daniel A. Crane, Beyond RFRA: Free Exercise of Religion Comes of Age in the State
Courts, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 235 (1998).
25. See James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclas-
tic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REv. 1407, 1445 (1992).
26. Id. at 1446 (footnotes omitted).
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quired.27 In Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 28 the Court held that "it is a
permissible legislative purpose to alleviate significant governmental
interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and
carry out their religious missions." The Court noted that "[w]here, as
here, government acts with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation
that burdens the exercise of religion, we see no reason to require that
the exemption come packaged with benefits to secular entities. 2 9
Even in cases striking down religious accommodations, the Court has
taken pains to explain that there was some specific defect in the law.
In Board of Education of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet,30 for example, the
Court explained that
we do not deny that the Constitution allows the State to accommo-
date religious needs by alleviating special burdens. Our cases leave
no doubt that in commanding neutrality the Religion Clauses do not
require the government to be oblivious to impositions that legiti-
mate exercise of state power may place on religious belief and
practice.31
In Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,32 Justice Brennan, writing for a plu-
rality of the Court, stated, "we in no way suggest that all benefits con-
ferred exclusively upon religious groups or upon individuals on
account of their religious beliefs are forbidden by the Establishment
Clause unless they are mandated by the Free Exercise Clause. 33
The only cases which held to the contrary were two Vietnam-era
draft cases in which the Court held that the term "religion" had to be
extended to include deeply held secular beliefs.34 However, in those
cases, the Court relied on the interpretation of a statute, and only Jus-
tice Harlan took the position that the Constitution forbids the singling
out of religion.
Nonetheless, some lawyers, judges, and academics argue that it is
unfair, and unconstitutional, to exempt religious believers or institu-
tions from laws that their secular counterparts are required to obey.
27. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's doctrine of religious accommodation, see Michael
W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 1; Michael W. McConnell, Ac-
commodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEoWASH. L. REV. 685,
698-708 (1992); see also Thomas C. Berg, The New Attacks on Religious Freedom Legislation,
And Why They Are Wrong, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 415, 434-43 (1999).
28. 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987).
29. Id. at 338. See also Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971); Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306 (1952).
30. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
31. Id. at 705.
32. 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
33. Id. at 18 n.8 (emphasis in original).
34. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
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These commentators claim that such "singling out" of religion for spe-
cial protection violates the neutrality commanded of the Religion
Clauses by "privileging" religion over nonreligion. Perhaps the most
prominent advocate of this position is Justice John Paul Stevens.
In City of Boerne v. Flores,35 the Court considered the constitution-
ality of the RFRA,36 which provides federal civil rights protection for
the exercise of religion, and only religion, when it is burdened by laws
which lack a sufficiently compelling public purpose. The particular
context of the case was the effort by the Catholic Church to resist the
city's decision to designate one its buildings as a historic landmark,
which would have prevented the Church from enlarging its sanctuary.
While the majority invalidated the RFRA as applied to state and local
government on the grounds of federalism, Justice Stevens wrote a con-
curring opinion in which he argued that, by "singling out" religion for
special protections, the RFRA violated the Establishment Clause. Ste-
vens wrote:
If the historic landmark on the hill in Boerne happened to be a mu-
seum or an art gallery owned by an atheist, it would not be eligible
for an exemption from the city ordinances that forbid an enlarge-
ment of the structure. Because the landmark is owned by the Catho-
lic Church, it is claimed that RFRA gives its owner a federal
statutory entitlement to an exemption from a generally applicable,
neutral civil law. Whether the Church would actually prevail under
the statute or not, the statute has provided the Church with a legal
weapon that no atheist or agnostic can obtain. This governmental
preference for religion, as opposed to irreligion, is forbidden by the
First Amendment.37
On its own terms, this argument is not very persuasive. To be sure, a
museum or an art gallery owned by an atheist would not be eligible
for an exemption under the RFRA, but neither would a museum or an
art gallery owned by a Catholic, a Buddhist, or a Jew. The question
under the RFRA is not who owns the building, but whether the build-
ing is used for the exercise of religion. Under this analysis, atheists
are also protected when they preach or proclaim their religious views,
or seek to carry such views into practice. If the "historic landmark on
the hill in Boerne" had been a meeting hall for the proclamation of
the truths of atheism, it would have received the same protection
under the RFRA that the Catholic Church received. (Atheists are
protected against religious discrimination under Title VII,38 and pre-
35. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (1994).
37. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536-537 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring).
38. See EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL No. 915.003 (Aug. 7, 2000) ("Religious discrimination
also includes discrimination against someone because s/he is an atheist."), citing Shapolia v. Los
2000]
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sumably, the RFRA would be similarly interpreted.) The problem (if
there is a problem) is not that religious people or institutions are fa-
vored over atheists, but rather, that religious exercise, whether en-
gaged in by Catholics, atheists, or anyone else, is protected, while
worthy nonreligious activity by the same parties does not receive
protection.
Scholars in law and related disciplines occasionally make a similar
argument against the legitimacy of religious accommodation. 39 For
example, according to Isaac Kramnick and Laurence Moore, in their
book, The Godless Constitution, religion should have "the same rights
in the public sphere as General Motors, no more and no less."'40 In a
similar vein, Professor Stephen Gey would interpret the Establish-
ment Clause as "prohibiting accommodation of religiously mandated
behavior beyond the scope of religious expression. '41 These argu-
ments have radical implications. Since General Motors is subject to
extensive regulation in almost every aspect of its operations,
Kramnick and Moore's position suggests that the authority of the
state to regulate or restrain the exercise of religion is substantial, and
that free exercise rights essentially do not exist beyond the mere ra-
tional basis scrutiny that applies to the regulation of economic activity.
Stephen Gey takes his position to the extreme of saying that a public
school gym teacher should not be permitted to allow Hindu or Muslim
girls to wear long pants with the gym uniform, where their religion
would not permit them to expose their legs.42 Presumably this position
also requires no accommodation to students for religious holidays, no
recognition of the priest-penitent privilege, and no exemptions from
sex discrimination laws for the all-male clergy.
Professors Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager have re-
cently offered a more nuanced and attractive version of the claim that
religious exercise may not be "singled out" for special protection that
is not accorded to similar nonreligious activity.43 Eisgruber and Sager
do not claim that government is forbidden to take steps to alleviate
the special problems entailed by the conflict between faith and law.
Alarnos National Laboratory, 773 F. Supp. 304, 305 (D.N.M. 1991), affd, Shapolia v. Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 13 F.3d 406 (10th Cir. 1993).
39. See, e.g., supra note 12.
40. IssAc KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION: THE CASE
AGAINST RELIGIOUS CORRECTNESS 15 (1996).
41. Gey, supra, note 12, at 182.
42. Id. at 183-84.
43. They set forth their views in a series of articles, including The Vulnerability of Conscience:
The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245 (1994); Why
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (1994); and
Unthinking Religious Freedom, 74 TEX. L. REV. 577 (1996).
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Rather, they insist that the measure of permissible religious accommo-
dation is the accommodation accorded to comparable secular con-
cerns. Eisgruber and Sager entitle this the principle of "equal regard,"
which "requires simply that government treat the deep, religiously in-
spired concerns of minority religious believers with the same regard as
that enjoyed by the deep concerns of citizens generally. '44 Thus, for
example, Eisgruber and Sager agree that workers who quit their jobs
because of religious conflicts with the work should be entitled to
workers compensation, however, they argue that similar treatment
should be given to workers with comparable conscientious, but secu-
lar, conflicts. 45 According to Eisgruber and Sager, there is "no consti-
tutional justification for the privileging of religion; to the contrary the
idea of a broad privilege for religiously motivated conduct baldly con-
tradicts the best understanding of the foundations of religious free-
dom."' 46 Under this standard, Eisgruber and Sager argue that the
RFRA is unconstitutional because it amounts to "privileging"
religion:
Equal regard calls upon courts to guard against policies that disfa-
vor fundamental secular commitments by comparison to religious
interests. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act explicitly protects
only those interests which are religious. If the statute's preference to
religion is interpreted restrictively and exclusively, the resulting fa-
voritism for religion is probably unconstitutional. 47
In the next section of this article, I will provide reasons for why these
arguments, in either their extreme form, or the milder form of "equal
regard," should not be accepted.
III. THE INEVITABILITY OF "SINGLING OUT" RELIGION
A. Privilege and Balance
At one level, it is puzzling that so many scholars and commentators
would regard the "singling out" of religion as problematic under our
Constitution. The very text of the Constitution "singles out" govern-
mental acts respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the
exercise of religion for special protections that are not accorded to any
aspect of human life. Religion is uncontroversially "singled out" under
the Establishment Clause. Government may subsidize or promote any
number of ideas, institutions, and activities - such as Planned
Parenthood, the "Got Milk?" campaign, Mexican Independence Day,
44. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 43, at 1285.
45. Id. at 1293.
46. Eisgruber & Sager, RFRA, supra note 43, at 448.
47. Eisgruber & Sager, Vulnerability, supra note 43, at 1308.
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or controversial art exhibits - however, it may not similarly subsidize
or promote religion. (As noted below, this fact does not prevent the
government from extending subsidies on neutral terms to religious in-
stitutions that provide public benefits.) On most matters, the govern-
ment is free to join its voice to public debate, and in the process, take
controversial positions. However, with regard to religion, the govern-
ment must be silent, or evenhanded. If singling out religion were con-
stitutionally problematic, this difference in treatment would be
difficult to explain.
Critics of free exercise exemptions complain, for example, that a
worker who is constructively discharged because of religious conflicts
with work is entitled to workers compensation, but a worker with sec-
ular objectives to the work, such as environmental issues, is not enti-
tled to such compensation. However, before declaring this discrepancy
unfair, it is necessary to illustrate that the government can (and does)
endorse the ideals of environmentalism, the -government can (and
does) inculcate environmentalist sensibilities in the public schools, the
government can (and does) establish an agency to promote the objec-
tives of environmentalism, and the government can (and does) use the
coercive power of the state to promote environmentalist objectives. If
we had a constitutional provision protecting the free exercise of be-
liefs about environmental protection, and forbidding the government
to establish an orthodoxy on that subject, the environmentalist worker
would be protected, and each of the above policies would also be un-
constitutional. However, beliefs about environmental protection are
not treated the same as beliefs about religion. With respect to relig-
ion, the government's hands are tied. In regard to other secular
causes, the government is free to impose these types of burdens, but it
is also free to promote the cause through legislative policy. I do not
believe that those commentators who believe it is unfair to protect the
religious worker, but not the environmentalist, would make the same
argument if such an approach required treating environmentalism the
same as religion across the board.
Similarly, Kramnick and Moore may believe that religion should re-
ceive no more protection from government regulation than General
Motors. However, they do not discuss the flip side of their argument.
The government is also free to promote and subsidize General Mo-
tors. (Remember the Chrysler bailout?) To treat General Motors in
the same way as we treat religion would constitutionalize a radical
version of laissez-faire deregulation. To treat religion in the same ways
we treat General Motors would provide the government virtual carte
blanch to promote, inhibit, and control religion. Neither alternative
[Vol. 50:1
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seems remotely similar to our constitutional tradition of religious free-
dom, or our basic intuitions about the proper scope of liberal
government.
The only constitutional regime that would not "single out" religion
would be one that deconstitutionalized the issue of religion, leaving
issues regarding the extent of regulation, subsidy, and control of relig-
ious activities to the discretion of the political branches. Even if the
First Amendment were interpreted, as the late Professor Philip Kur-
land famously suggested and some modern scholars continue to pro-
pose, as a prohibition of all laws that use the category of "religion" as
a criterion for the distribution of benefits or the imposition of penal-
ties,48 such a rule would "single out" religion by requiring the govern-
ment to refrain from using religion as a basis for legal categorization.
When we look at the Religion Clauses as a whole, we see that the
question of singling out religion is not one of "privilege," but rather
one of balance. The Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses serve a
complementary function: to reduce the power of government over re-
ligion, whether to help, hurt, or control, to the greatest extent consis-
tent with the achievement of legitimate secular objectives.
Interference with the practice of religion is avoided where possible;
support for religion is virtually prohibited; and control over religion is
kept to a bare minimum. This approach means that religion is free,
however, it also means that religion cannot use the arm of the state to
affirmatively advance its own objectives. Such an approach creates a
trade-off that few other ideologies or systems of belief would care to
make. Eisgruber and Sager give this hands-off principle the unattrac-
tive label of "unimpaired flourishing, '49 however, that is a misleading
term. Not only must religion be "unimpaired," but it must also be
unsponsored, uncontrolled, and unpromoted. As a result, religion
may not "flourish," but rather, wither away. The fate of religion will
be determined not by the government, but by "the zeal of its adher-
ents and the attractiveness of its dogma."'50 The unifying principle, in
brief, is "let it alone." Of course, in a complex world in which the
government interacts with almost every facet of our lives, it is not al-
ways easy to determine what course of action best leaves religious
matters to private judgment. However, whatever the specific context,
48. See PHILIP B. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW OF CHURCH AND STATE AND THE SU-
PREME COURT 18 (1962); Philip B. Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REV. 3, 24 (Nov. 1978). For a
modern example, see Mark V. Tushnet, "Of Church and State and the Supreme Court": Kurland
Revisited, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 373 (1989).
49. Eisgruber & Sager, Vulnerability, supra note 43, at 1254.
50. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313.
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religion receives special consideration, not so that it can be privileged,
but rather, that it may be left alone.
B. The Deliberate Character of the Special Treatment of Religion
Religion was not "singled out" in the constitutional text by accident.
The Framers of the First Amendment seriously considered enacting
constitutional protection for "conscience," presumably a broader
term, and deliberately adopted the term "religion" instead. 5'
Madison's original draft contained both a "religion" clause and a
"conscience" clause. 52 The Select Committee shortened Madison's
proposal, eliminating the "religion" provision and protecting the
"equal rights of conscience. ' 53 The full House of Representatives re-
turned to Madison's idea of protecting both ideas: "Congress shall
make no law establishing religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof, nor shall the rights of conscience be infringed. '54 The pres-
ence of both "religion" and "conscience" in different clauses of this
proposal strongly suggests that the two terms were not considered sy-
nonymous. The Senate then voted on a succession of drafts, some pro-
tecting "the rights of conscience" and some protecting the "free
exercise [of religion]. '55 In the end, the Framers settled on the term
"religion." It is evident from this history that the Framers of the First
Amendment considered the possibility of extending protection to the
full range of "conscience," but determined, in the end, to protect "re-
ligion" alone. This historical fact casts doubt on the suggestion of
some commentators56 that the constitutional term "religion" should
be broadly interpreted in order to encompass secular claims of con-
science. Regardless of whether such a broad interpretation would be
a good idea,57 such a step would constitute an amendment, not an
interpretation, of the First Amendment, and one that the Framers spe-
cifically considered, debated, and ultimately rejected.
51. For a more detailed discussion of the framing of the Free Exercise Clause and the relation-
ship of "religion" to "conscience," see Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Un-
derstanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1480-1500 (May 1990).
52. Cogan, supra note 1, at 1.
53. Id. at 2 (Report of House Committee, July 28, 1789).
54. Id. at 3 (House Resolution, August 24, 1789).
55. Id. at 3-6 (Senate Consideration, August 25 - September 9, 1789).
56. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313,
326-39 (1996); Ira Lupu, The Trouble With Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 743,778-79
(Mar. L992); Rodney K. Smith, Converting the Religious Equality Amendment into a Statute with
a Little Conscience, 1996 BYU L. REV. 645, 662-75.
57. Eisgruber and Sager explain why such an expansion is normative undesirable. Eisgruber
and Sager, Vulnerability, supra note 43, at 1268-70.
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In confirmation of this conclusion, the Framers of the Bill of Rights
engaged in a focused debate on religious accommodation in connec-
tion with what is now the Second Amendment, at roughly the same
time as the debates over the First Amendment. 58 Madison proposed
an amendment to exempt from militia service those who were "relig-
iously scrupulous of bearing arms."' 59 The proposal passed the House
of Representatives and failed narrowly in the Senate. Interestingly,
some members of the First Congress, as if they anticipated the modern
argument, insisted that any exemption should be confined to the relig-
ious and not extended to "those who are of no religion. ' 60 One repre-
sentative explained that "[i]t has been urged that religion is on the
decline; if so, the argument is more strong in my favor, for when the
time comes that religion shall be discarded, the generality of persons
will have recourse to these pretexts to get excused from bearing
arms."'61 No one suggested broadening the exemption to nonreligious
objectors.
As already noted,62 most opponents did not disagree with the un-
derlying objective of the amendment, they objected to the proposal to
constitutionalize the matter rather than leaving it to ordinary legisla-
tion. In fact, the representative who moved to strike the proposal
commented that he had "no reason to believe but the legislature will
always possess humanity enough to indulge this class of citizens in a
matter they are so desirous of." However, he argued that if the pro-
posal were made "part of the constitution, it will be a question before
the judiciary, on every regulation you make with respect to the organi-
zation of the militia, whether it comports with this declaration or not,"
and that it would be "extremely injudicious to intermix matters of
doubt with fundamentals. '63 This reasoning is not unlike the reason-
ing of Justice Scalia in the Smith case. In Smith, the Court did not
dispute the "desirability" of free exercise exemptions, 64 but concluded
that it is "not within the judicial ken" to determine how important or
central a religious practice is, or to balance this against governmental
interests. 65 It is "horrible to contemplate," the opinion stated, a legal
rule under which "courts would constantly be in the business of deter-
58. For a more detailed discussion, see Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, supra note 51, at 1495-96, 1500-03.
59. Cogan, supra note 1, at 169.
60. Id. at 189 (Rep. Scott).
61. Id. at 189-90.
62. Id.
63. Cogan, supra note 1, at 187 (Mr. Benson).
64. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
65. Id. at 887 (citation omitted).
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mining whether the 'severe impact' of various laws on religious prac-
tice ... suffices to permit us to confer an exemption. '66
From the debates over the drafting of the Bill of Rights, we can see
that some Framers believed that religious concerns should be given
constitutional protection, some thought protection for religious con-
cerns was desirable but should be left to legislative discretion, and
some opposed exemptions altogether; however, no member of the
First Congress expressed the view that it is improper to extend protec-
tion to "religious sentiments" without treating nonreligious sentiments
with equal regard.
In recent years, there has been extensive debate over whether, dur-
ing the founding period, religious accommodation was understood pri-
marily as a constitutional obligation of government or as a matter of
legislative discretion.67 However, not one historian or constitutional
scholar has claimed that the founding generation deemed religious ac-
commodations illegitimate. Accommodations of religion during the
years leading up to the framing of the First Amendment were com-
mon (the most frequent examples were exemption from military con-
scription or jury duty, exemption from oath requirements, and
exemption from tithes).68 These exemptions illustrate that "singling
out" religion for special protection was deemed permissible, even if
not constitutionally compelled.
In light of this history, it is not plausible to object to interpretations
of free exercise on the basis that they do not accord "equal regard" to
secular forms of conscience because the decision to differentiate be-
tween the two was made by the Framers. As Professor Douglas Lay-
cock has observed:
Religion is unlike other human activities, or at least the founders
thought so. The proper relation between religion and government
66. Id. at 889 n.5.
67. Generally supporting free exercise exemptions include Michael W. McConnell, The Ori-
gins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, supra, note 51; Michael W. Mc-
Connell, Freedom from Persecution or Protection of the Rights of Conscience? A Critique of
Justice Scalia's Historical Arguments in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & M. L. REV. 819
(1998): John Witte, Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American Constitu-
tional Experiment, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 371 (1996); Douglas Kmiec, The Original Under-
standing of the Free Exercise Clause and Religious Diversity, 59 UMKC L. REV. 591 (1991); W.
Cole Durham, Jr., Religious Liberty and the Call of the Conscience, 42 DEPAUL L. R. 71 (1992).
Arguing that free exercise exemptions were not understood to be required include Michael J.
Malbin, RELIGION AND POLITICS (1978); Philip Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious
Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992); Ellis M. West, The
Case Against a Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y
623 (1990); Gerard Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemptions and the Siren Song of Liber-
alism, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 245 (1991).
68. See McConnell, supra note 51, at 1466-73.
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was a subject of great debate in the founding generation, and the
Constitution includes two clauses that apply to religion and do not
apply to anything else. This debate and these clauses presuppose
that religion is in some way a special human activity, requiring spe-
cial rules applicable only to it.69
The text does not necessarily compel the conclusion that the Smith
decision was wrong or that religious exercise is entitled to protection
from formally neutral laws, however, it does compel the conclusion
that religion has a special and unique place in our constitutional order.
Eisgruber and Sager declare the argument from constitutional text
"singularly unconvincing," however, their reaction seems to be based
on a general disdain for reliance on the words and history of the Con-
stitution as a basis for interpretation. "[T]he project of constitutional
interpretation," they say, "involves the pragmatic pursuit of political
justice, not the positivist recovery of fixed historical meaning. ' 70 Eis-
gruber and Sager concede that the textual references to religion
demonstrate that "religious activities are more important than matters
of fashion or recreation," however, they assert that the text "pro-
vide[s] no ground for privileging religion by comparison to compara-
bly serious secular commitments."'7 1 This statement represents the
entirety of their textual argument. Yet the constitutional text refers to
"religion," and not to "secular commitments." No mention was made
in 1789 of fashion or recreation, however, the Framers of the First
Amendment considered, and rejected, drafts that would have pro-
tected "conscience." Eisgruber and Sager do not explain why this fact
is not significant. They also argue that the enactment of the Equal
Protection Clause "deprived religion of any special constitutional re-
spect it had enjoyed before Reconstruction. ' 72 Eisgruber and Sager
fail to cite any evidence to support their remarkable proposition. As
the heirs of the abolitionist movement, which was itself an offshoot of
the Second Great Awakening, it would be surprising if the Framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment intended to deprive religion of any of the
constitutional respect it had received during its historical existence.
The most complete historical analysis of that issue suggests that the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment embraced, rather than re-
jected, the idea of free exercise exemptions for religion.73
69. Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 16.
70. Eisgruber & Sager, Vulnerability, supra note 43, at 1270.
71. Id. at 1271.
72. Id. at 1272.
73. Kurt T. Lash. The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1106 (1994).
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In short, the text and history of the First Amendment is impossible
to square with the theory that religious accommodations are necessa-
rily unconstitutional.
C. Ideas and Arguments
The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment were not created out
of whole cloth, but rather, were the culmination of centuries of theo-
logical and political debate over the proper relation between spiritual
and temporal authorities. 74 This discussion was part of a wider debate
regarding the relation of government to other aspects of human soci-
ety. To some extent, the religious debate was parallel to, or a model
for, debate about other issues. For example, the struggle for the free-
dom to publish religious tracts was a precursor to the struggle for the
freedom of the press more generally, as the freedom to gather to-
gether for purposes of religious worship was for the freedom of assem-
bly. In this sense, religious freedom was not always "singled out," but
was sometimes treated as the paradigm or prototype for liberal free-
dom more generally. 75 However, a great deal of the debate was con-
ducted in terms that were distinctive to religion, and remain
inapplicable to nonreligious matters.
1. Separation of Church and State
One of the central (if often misunderstood) ideas in our constitu-
tional tradition is that the institutions of church and state must be sep-
arate and independent from one another. 76 The famous phrase, "the
wall of separation between church and state, '77 emerged from the pen
of Thomas Jefferson, however the idea was much older. The concept
was rooted in a centuries old struggle between ecclesiastical and civil
authorities over who would control the church, and what part, if any,
the church would play in the selection and validation of political lead-
ers. Indeed, the idea of a jurisdictional separation between religious
and temporal authority has roots which extend as far back as the Fifth
Century, long before there was any real conception of individual con-
74. See John Witte, Jr., RELIGION AN1) THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 7-55
(2000).
75. 1 develop this theme more fully in Michael W. McConnell, Why Is Religious Liberty the
"First Freedom"?, 21 CARDozo L. REV. 1243, 1251-53 (2000).
76. Elsewhere, I have pointed out the inadequacies of the idea of "separation" to account for
our constitutional tradition of religious liberty. See Michael W. McConnell, Believers As Equal
Citizens, in OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSI1P AND DEMANDS OF FAITH 90, 93-97 (Nancy L. Rosen-
blum, ed., 2000).
77. Thomas Jefferson, Letter to the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), reprinted in 5
THE FOUNDERS CONSTITUTION 96 (Philip Kurland & Ralph Lerner, eds., 1987).
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science in matters of religion in papal teachings regarding the freedom
of the church from the control of the Emperor. 78 This separation is
deeply imprinted in the Western historical experience, with such epi-
sodes as the martyrdoms of Becket and More to impart the lesson to
succeeding generations. Church-state separation was most immedi-
ately an extension of Protestant "two kingdoms" theology, which was
preached in different forms by the great Reformers, Luther and Cal-
vin, and deeply affected the political theory of Western Europe. 79
Two-kingdoms theology conceived of humans as owing allegiance to
two different sets of authorities, the spiritual and the temporal. "God
has appointed two kinds of government in the world," explained Isaac
Backus, a Baptist leader and one of the most influential advocates of
religious freedom at the Founding. These governments "are distinct in
their nature, and ought never to be confounded together; one of which
is called civil, the other ecclesiastical government." 80 John Locke had
made this separation between spiritual and temporal spheres the cen-
terpiece of his prescription for religious toleration, which in turn was a
principal influence on Jefferson. 8' For the protection of religious lib-
erty, Locke "esteem[ed] it above all things necessary to distinguish
exactly the business of civil government from that of religion and to
settle the just bounds that lie between the one and the other. ' 82 The
"whole jurisdiction" of government, he wrote, is confined to "civil
concernments," which consisted of protecting the "life, liberty, health,
and indolency of body; and the possession of outward things, such as
money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like," leaving the "salvation
of souls" to religious authorities.8 3
It is difficult to say whether this duality between "church" and
"state" reflects an essential ontological difference, arising from the na-
ture of the subject, or whether it is a product of the post-pagan West-
78. See Brian Tierney, Religious Rights: A Historical Perspective, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN
WESTERN THOUGHT 29, 34 (Noel Reynolds & Cole Durhan, eds., 1996).
79. See 2 JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 184 (Ford L. Battle ed. &
trans., 1975); Martin Luther, Temporal Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed, in 45
LUTHER'S WORKS 75, 81-129 (Walther I. Brandt ed. & J.J. Schindel trans., 1962); see generally
ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED ro RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 3,
56-57 (1990).
80. Isaac Backus, An Appeal to the Public for Religious Liberty (1773), reprinted in PoLIICAL
SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA 334-35 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 1991) [hereinafter PoLrr-
ICAL SERMONS].
81. See Kessler, Locke's Influence on Jefferson's "Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom," 25
J. CHURCH & STATE 231 (1983).
82. John Locke, Essay on Toleration, in 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE 1, 9 (Locke 1823 and
photo. reprint 1963).
83. Id. at 10.
2000]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
ern historical experience.8 4 The idea may even be specific to the
Biblical religions, with their conception of a loving and all powerful
God who is the source of moral value, and thus, in competition with
earthy rulers. It is not obvious that other religions present the same
dualistic relationship to the state. I personally incline toward the es-
sentialist explanation, believing that matters of the spirit are funda-
mentally outside the sphere of force and coercion, which is the
province of the state. With what other human activity, commitment,
worldview, or institution is the government so fundamentally sepa-
rated? Surely, not all matters of "conscience," for who would argue
that state action should be unaffected by convictions of right and
wrong, or that the state is disabled from attempting to convey ideas of
right and wrong to succeeding generations? Nonetheless, whether this
dualism is natural and essential, or historical and socially constructed,
is essentially irrelevant because it is so deeply engrained in our politi-
cal, constitutional, and theological traditions that it must be accepted
as an assumption upon which our constitutional culture rests.85
One could argue that the "separation between church and state" is
simply an instantiation of the more general idea of separation be-
tween public and private, which is central to liberalism. 86 Viewed in
this light, religion is not "singled out," but rather, is properly under-
stood as only one example of the "private" that is protected from gov-
ernment interference and control. In a general sense, I believe this
idea is correct. There are strong similarities between church-state doc-
trine and other doctrines of constitutional privacy.87 Nonetheless, rec-
84. In some cultures, such as ancient Rome, church and state were so closely tied that no
useful distinction could be made between them. I am not sure whether this counts as evidence
that the church-state dualism is merely conventional, or simply as evidence that there are multi-
ple responses to the problem posed by the church-state dualism, including the answer that the
dualism should be dissolved.
85. 1 should emphasize to the incautious reader that I am not here arguing that the idea of
free exercise exemptions, or any other specific constitutional doctrine, is logically entailed by this
tradition of church-state dualism, but only that thinking about religious freedom and constitu-
tional liberty must proceed from the assumption of a dualism between religious and temporal
authority.
86. See, e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, Public Principle and Private Choice: the Uneasy Case for
a Boundary Maintenance Theory of Constitutional Law, 96 YALE L. J. 1006 (1987). This seems to
be a major part of Eisgruber and Sager's analysis (Vulnerability, supra note 43, at 1273-74).
87. 1 drew parallels between church-state doctrine and the abortion question in Michael W.
McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions and Religious Schools, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 989, 994-96 (1991), and between church-state doctrine and issues of sexual orientation in
Michael W. McConnell, What Would It Mean 7b Have a "First Amendment" For Sexual Orienta-
tion?, in SEXUAL ORIENTATION & HUMAN RIGHI-Ts IN AMERICAN RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE (Saul
M. Olyan & Martha Nussbaum, eds., 1998).
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ognition of the similarity does not eliminate the need for a "special"
treatment of religion.
First, the aspects of human life that are deemed sufficiently "pri-
vate" to be shielded from state power are few, and the treatment they
receive from the law is correspondingly "special. ' 88 Thus, recognition
that religious life is a subset of constitutionally protected private life
does not require that religion ceases to be "singled out," but only that
a few other aspects of life, such as those pertaining to procreation and
childrearing, also be "singled out." Many of the secular activities
whose differential treatment from religion concerns the critics of "sin-
gling out," such as the atheist-owned art museum (Justice Stevens),
General Motors (Kramnick and Moore), or the secular conscientious
objector to work on military projects (Eisgruber and Sager), are not
''private" in any constitutionally recognized sense of that term.
Second, even among the class of human concerns deemed constitu-
tionally "private," the applicable legal principles are not the same.
The right to abortion, for example, is treated constitutionally as "pri-
vate" for purposes of regulatory authority, however, when the ques-
tion becomes if abortion is sufficiently "public" to warrant public
subsidy, the legislature is permitted to decide. 9 Families are treated as
intimate associations within the protection of constitutional privacy,90
however, issues such as marriage, divorce, adoption, the education of
children, and the consequences of dissolution are subject to longstand-
ing and often quite intrusive state regulation. It is possible to draw
useful comparisons between family autonomy and church autonomy,91
but there are "special" considerations applicable to each, which lead
to somewhat different legal arrangements. Indeed, every human con-
cern subsumed in the category of "the private" has its own "special"
features, and none of the concerns can be treated precisely the same
as any other. The attempt to ground protection for religious freedom
in the wider category of freedom for intrinsically "private" matters
thus falls short.
This idea may be illustrated by an example analyzed by Eisgruber
and Sager. Under current constitutional doctrine, even after Smith,
churches and synagogues have an absolute right to select their spiri-
88. For a summary of the modern constitutional doctrine of privacy, see Tom Gerety, Right of
Privacy (Update), in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, SUPP. I, at 461 (Leonard
Levy ed., 1999).
89. See McConnell, supra note 87.
90. Roberts v. United States JayCees, 468 U.S. 609, 619-20 (1984); see generally Robert Burt,
The Constitution of the Family, 1979 Sup. CT. REv. 329.




tual leaders without being subject to second-guessing on behalf of the
state, even when the conduct would otherwise violate the anti-discrim-
ination laws. 92 This is a right that other institutions in our society do
not enjoy. Businesses are subject to anti-discrimination laws, as are
labor unions, political parties, newspapers, private voluntary associa-
tions, and other constitutionally protected groups. Some groups may
be able to show that anti-discrimination laws are unconstitutional as
applied to their particular circumstance, typically because discrimina-
tion forms a part of their expressive identity. The Ku Klux Klan, for
example, could not be forced to hire black leaders, 93 the Boy Scouts
do not have to accept openly gay scoutmasters, 94 and a theatrical di-
rector is presumably permitted to take race into account in choosing
actors to play particular roles. However, the religious exemption is far
broader than these examples. A church or synagogue does not need
to demonstrate that employment of any particular person would be
inconsistent with its expressive purpose; the law respects the funda-
mental autonomy of religion with respect to all employment in a relig-
ious capacity. Although this privilege is of "special character," it is
well established in the caselaw, and - as Eisgruber and Sager point out
- reflects a "widely held" view.95 Most people would find it shocking
for the government to tell the Catholic Church or an Orthodox syna-
gogue that it must hire women as priests or rabbis. This exemption is
a fundamental aspect of the separation between church and state.
Eisgruber and Sager attempt to justify this exemption with an anal-
ogy to other distinctively private decisions.96 "Religious leaders," they
say,
[a]re moral advisors, confidants, friends, and spiritual guides. The
state cannot prescribe a nondiscriminatory protocol for a group's
choice of the person who is to bear this private responsibility to its
members any more than the state could prescribe such a protocol
for the selection of a psychiatrist, or of a neighbor in whom to con-
fide one's hopes and concerns. The aspects of religious practice that
are uncontroversially secure from the reach of some state com-
92. See, e.g., Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., No. 99-10603, 2000 WL
192100, at *6 (11 th Cir. Feb. 17, 2000); Combs v. Central Texas Annual Conference of the United
Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 350 (5th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am.. 83 F.3d
455. 470 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Young v. Northern Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21
F.3d 184, 187-88 (7th Cir. 1994): Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d
360, 363 (8th Cir. 1991); Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 772 F.2d
1164, 1168-69 (4th Cir. 1985); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir. 1972).
93. Invisible Empire of the Knights of the KKK v. Mayor of Thurmont, 700 F. Supp. 281, 289
(D. Md. 1988).
94. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
95. Eisgruber & Sager, Vulnerability, supra note 43, at 1275.
96. Id. at 1276.
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mands are so secure because they are private in general and recog-
nizable ways, not because they are religious .... The controversial
aspect of religious exemptions begins at precisely the point where
the general shield of private behavior leaves off.9 7
Nonetheless, there is no general exemption from antidiscrimination
laws for "private" activities. Individuals may choose their own neigh-
bor or psychiatrist in whom to confide, however, that is only because
the employment laws do not apply in such situations. If a clinic, the
institutional analogue to a church in this example, discriminated in its
hiring of a staff psychiatrist, no "privacy" rationale would screen the
decision from the law. Employment relations, even within the private
sphere, are covered by antidiscrimination laws, and enjoy constitu-
tional protection only in narrow circumstances. In fact, contrary to
Eisgruber and Sager, there is no general category of "private" em-
ployment into which clerical hiring fits. The religious exception is sui
generis. If Eisgruber and Sager are correct, that the "controversial
aspect of religious exemptions begins at precisely the point where the
general shield of private behavior leaves off," then the exemption for
clerical employment should in fact be controversial. 98
Eisgruber and Sager are thus correct in stating that the separation
between church and state bears a family resemblance to more general
doctrines grounded in the public-private distinction; however, they are
incorrect in stating that the limits of chuch-state separation are con-
gruent with the public-private distinctions as interpreted in other
areas.
A version of the public-private dichotomy that is currently the sub-
ject of renewed scholarly attention is the idea of "civil society" - the
network of voluntary associations, mediating between individuals and
the state, that shape and develop public values and culture.99 "Civil
society" is especially important to liberal democratic regimes because
the nonsectarian nature of the regimes makes them incapable of de-
veloping and inculcating public virtue. This important task is left to
97. Id. at 1276.
98. It is controversial in some circles, but not for reasons relating to the "singling out" of
religion. See Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value: The Case for Apply-
ing Employment Discrimination Laws to Religion. 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1049 (1996).
99. See PETER L. BERGER & RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS. To EMPOWER PEOPLE: FROM STATE
TO CIVIL SOCIETY (2d ed. 1996); ERNEST GELLNER, CONDITIONS OF LIBERTY: CIVIL SOCIETY
AND IFS RIVALS (1994); JEAN L. COHEN & ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL
THEORY (1992); Symposium on Legal and Constitutional Implications of the Calls to Revive Civil
Society, 75 CHI-KENT L. REV. 289 (2000).
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institutions independent of the government."°' Churches are certainly
part perhaps the paradigm of this "civil society."
One could argue that constitutional protection is given to churches
because they are institutions of "civil society" not because of any con-
siderations peculiar to religion. Such an argument, however, would be
required to abstract substantially from the reality of the law. Although
a wide variety of constitutional doctrines protect the autonomy of va-
rious types of civil association in various contexts, the sum of the parts
is not impressive. As Professor Mark Tushnet recently concluded,
"contemporary constitutional doctrine gives "civil society" a relatively
small protected domain."'' Moreover, there are few constraints par-
allel to the Establishment Clause that are applicable to secular civil
associations. The government can require dissidents to join or contrib-
ute to labor unions and bar associations even when they disagree
strongly about the ideological stances of those organizations; 1112 the
government can give grants to support the expressive activity of pri-
vate groups; and public school curriculum can inculcate controversial
ideological viewpoints, as long as they are secular and not religious.
Thus, while religious institutions are only but one type of "civil soci-
ety" institution, they are accorded far more constitutional freedom,
and entitled to far less government assistance, than any other
institution.
The special character of religion within the ranks of "civil society"
institutions is based, in large part, on Western historical experience.
The Framers of the Constitution were well aware of three facts. First,
churches had long been the primary institutions for the development
and inculcation of ideas about virtue. Second, official state alignment
with a single religion was very frequently a source of discord, persecu-
tion, and even civil war. Third, government support for religion
tended to weaken rather than strengthen the recipient. 10 3 In light of
the third fact, the Framers realized that the advantages of the first
(inculcation of public virtue) could be achieved, and the dangers of
the second (discord and persecution) eliminated, by the same policy:
100. See Michael W. McConnell, The New Establishmentarianism, 75 CHi.-KEN" L. REV. 453,
453-59 (2000).
101. Mark V. Tushnet, The Constitution of Civil Society, 75 CIii.-KENT L. REV. 379, 412 (2000)
(emphasis omitted).
102. Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1 (1990); Abood v. Detroit Board of Educa-
tion, 431 U.S. 209 (1976). On the differences between restrictions on compelled support for
advocacy under the Free Speech Clause and the Religion Clauses, see Michael W. McConnell,
Political and Religious Disestablishment, 1986 BYU L. REV. 405.




the disestablishment of religion. Again, it is difficult to say whether
this concatenation of results was due to essential ontological differ-
ences between the religious and the secular, or is contingent on the
Western historical experience. Nevertheless, it does not matter
whether the differences are essential or contingent, because historical
experience provides a rational justification for constitutional arrange-
ments. It is not obvious that other features of our constitutional tradi-
tion could survive the acid bath of skeptical inquiry into whether they
are based on essential features of human existence. It is enough that
the American people, on the basis of the experience of their ancestors,
made the determination that these restrictions and protections would
be conducive to the peace and happiness of the republic, and continue
to support these arrangements.
As a believer in the importance of an independent "civil society," I
find the current weak state of constitutional protection for freedom of
association disturbing, and believe that we should consider using the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses as a model for heightening
the protections for other civil associations. The recent decision in Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale,10 4 protecting the right of expressive as-
sociations to control their own membership and leadership criteria, is
a move in that direction. It is interesting, and encouraging, that the
right to forego formal schooling for one's children, recognized in Wis-
consin v. Yoder'0 5 as applying only to religious families, has now been
extended, as a practical matter, to all families under the rubric of
homeschooling. Nevertheless, it is impossible to claim that religious
and secular institutions within "civil society" are now treated the same
way, or even that the various nonreligious civil associations are
treated the same way. Moreover, as a normative matter, it is unlikely
that such institutions will ever be treated the same. The concept of
"civil society" is too diverse to eliminate the need for special provi-
sions for religious associations. Religious institutions are the clearest
and most firmly established examples of "civil society" institutions.
While the principles of separation can be borrowed as a model for
others in many cases, it would be a grave mistake to insist that the
level of protection be reduced to the least common denominator.
2. The Government is Not a Competent Judge of Religious Truth
A second, recurring argument for free exercise and disestablish-
ment protections was, in Madison's words, that "the Civil Magistrate
104. 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
105. 405 U.S. 205 (1981).
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is [not] a competent Judge of Religious Truth. ' 10 6 This statement im-
plies an epistemic, as opposed to an institutional, basis for the special
place of religion under liberal democracy. This idea remains a widely
shared intuition. "Faith" is distinguished from "reason,"' 07 and "rea-
son" is said to be the hallmark of liberal governance. 108 Even Eis-
gruber and Sager acknowledge that an epistemic difference provides
warrant for some degree of special treatment of religion:
[F]or purposes of assessing the impact of a sincerely held scheme of
religious belief upon the believer, the ultimate truth or the reasona-
bility of the scheme is beyond the constitutional competence of the
state. This is implicit in the requirement of equal regard that the
state defer to the perspective of a religious believer as to the exis-
tence of an interest of great weight within her life; it is a function of
the epistemically distinct, closed logic of religious belief.109
Why is the civil magistrate an incompetent judge of religious truth?
Democratic government has the greatest competency with respect to
determinations about what will best serve the public interest. One
could even argue that properly constituted representative institutions
are a more reliable judge than any individual of the content of social
ethics. Since we are each highly (and often unconsciously) self-cen-
tered, representatives of society as a whole may be more likely to de-
velop and enforce mutually beneficial rules regarding how we should
behave toward one another than any other decision making method
that comes to mind. The result may not be correct, however, there is
reason to believe that the result is likely to be superior to the alterna-
tives, including one's own opinion. A great deal of what government
does can be understood in these terms. Moreover, where a decision
involves specialized information that is in the hands of governmental
elites, a reasonable citizen is justified in treating the civil magistrate as
a more competent judge than he would be himself.
This statement is not true for religious matters. The government
cannot be a competent judge of religious truth because there is no
reason to believe that religious understanding has been vouchsafed to
the majority, or to any governmental elite. If I find that fifty-five per-
cent of Americans believe that Elvis Presley is a god, this provides no
106. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, 5, re-
printed in KURLAND & LERNER, supra note 77, at 83.
107. See Stephen L. Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a Hobby,
1987 DUKE L.J. 977, 987-94; Allan Ides, Bowers v. Hardwick: The Enigmatic Fifth Vote and The
Reasonableness of Moral Certitude, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 93, 105-06 (1992).
108. On the central role of "public reason" in liberal government, see JOHN RAWLS, POLITI-
CAL LiBERALISM 216-20 (1993); Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORAL-
try 13-43 (Stuart Hampshire ed.,1978).
109. Eisgruber & Sager, Vulnerability, supra note 43, at 1292.
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reason for me to accept the idea. God does not speak through political
majorities. As Madison illustrated, in matters of religion, on which
the eternal salvation of one's soul may rest, "the opinions of men,
depending only on the evidence contemplated by their own minds,
cannot follow the dictates of other men."] 10
Of course, religious-truth is far from unique in this respect. There
are many fields of knowledge where neither democratic majorities nor
governmental elites have any special access to the truth. A physicist,
for example, would not be moved to alter his understanding of the
workings of physical laws upon learning that Congress or an adminis-
trative agency had reached a contrary conclusion. The scientist would
simply run the experiment again, and check the data. There are, in-
deed, many matters where "the dictates of other men" are not proba-
tive about the truth of the matter. Religion is scarcely unique in this
respect.
Nevertheless, merely because the civil magistrate is not a competent
judge of a particular category of truth does not mean that it enjoys any
special constitutional status, beyond the free speech rights enjoyed by
all. For example, the fact that democratic majorities are not compe-
tent to judge the truths of physics has not been taken to imply that
government should refrain from involvement with the subject. The
state teaches the truths of physics in its schools, bases decisions on its
understanding of physics, and doles out money to physics experiments
and projects based on its evaluation of their relative merits. Hetero-
dox views on physics warrant protection as a matter of academic free-
dom, however, those protections are of a different sort than the
Religion Clauses provide for religion. It does not make sense to re-
quire the government to treat physics with the same scrupulous neu-
trality that it extends to religion." 'I
Another example can be found in public support for the arts. As
with physics and religion, there is no reason to suppose that the civil
magistrate is a competent judge of artistic merit. Art, like religion, is a
deeply controversial matter. Some people object strenuously to being
forced to support some artistic displays. To artists, the activity is a
deeply important aspect of personal identity. It is partly for this rea-
son that artists, like preachers, and unlike engineers, are among the
110. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments § 1 (1785),
reprinted in KURLAND & LERNER, supra note 77, at 82.
111. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission recently opined that a heterodox posi-
tion on a scientific matter - namely, belief in cold fusion - constitutes a religious belief and is
thus protected against discrimination. See Curt Supplee, EEOC Backs "Cold Fusion" Devotee,
Aug. 23, 2000, WASH. POST at A23. An assertion that will strike most people as absurd.
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most assertive of groups about the importance of being given unfet-
tered freedom of expression. Nevertheless, the legal regimes applica-
ble to art and religion are entirely different. There are courses in art in
every public school, and no one worries that they may problematically
shape the artistic sensibilities of the younger generation. There is a
National Endowment for the Arts (NEA), which distributes funds on
the basis of the professional judgment of government appointed ex-
perts about relative artistic quality. Such a system surely has an effect
on the types of art that are produced. In contrast, public schools do
not offer courses that train children how to engage in or appreciate
religion. In addition, there are no boards of government appointed
religious experts empowered to decide which preachers should receive
public subvention. We respect the rights of dissenters not to be forced
to contribute to the dissemination of religious messages, and realize
that government power to determine the most worthy recipients of
public largesse would be a threat to the freedom of religion. None of
these ideas are true of art.
It may be tempting to attribute the special character of religion, in
this respect, to an epistemic difference between "faith" and "reason."
Such arguments should be advanced with caution. "Faith" and "rea-
son" are not opposite, or even dichotomous, but rather, are overlap-
ping terms. Faith is a warranted confidence in matters that cannot be
proven with certitude. The fact that sources of religious revelation dif-
fer from tradition to tradition, and person to person, makes it danger-
ous to generalize, however, it is safe to state that in the predominant
religious tradition of the West, faith and reason are more complemen-
tary than opposed. In arriving at a faith position, believers employ all
the standard tools of reason. Professor Larry Alexander argues that a
person's religious beliefs are "supported in exactly the same way as
are her beliefs that Washington was the first president, that Kinshasha
is the capital of Zaire, that Mars hit sixty-one home runs, and that the
speed of light is constant."' 12 Alexander explains that a person "does
not believe any of these things based on first-hand observation, and
the last item she finds counter-intuitive and impossible to conceptual-
ize, though she believes it, nonetheless."'1 3 Under the same analysis,
individuals and governments make judgments about many matters
that are no less controversial than religion and no more susceptible to
objective reason. Among these are questions of esthetics, loyalty, sen-
timent, and many aspects of morality. Indeed, some modern theories
112. Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, 30 SAN DIEOO L.




of the philosophy of knowledge suggest that even seemingly objective
forms of knowledge, like science, rest ultimately on the same type of
faith claims that undergird religious beliefs.11 4
This article is not the place, nor am I the person, to resolve these
epistemological debates. My own inclination is to reject the claim that
the apprehension of religion truth rests on the "same" epistemic foun-
dation as these other judgments of esthetics, ethics, science, or any-
thing else. However, I would also reject the claim that there is any
common epistemic method ("reason") that undergirds each of these
fields. We judge different matters by different standards of evidence
and by different faculties of the human mind, and we cannot expect
agreement as to what those standard are, or how to employ the differ-
ent faculties. Religious judgments are thus different, but they are not
in a class by themselves.
There is, however, a widespread consensus in our society, shared
equally by believers and unbelievers, about one idea: religion, like
love, is a judgment most of us prefer to make for ourselves. This state-
ment is especially true in our individualist culture, so heavily influ-
enced by Protestantism, which treats every person as equally capable
of receiving the revelation of God's will. The incompetence of the
magistrate to judge religious truth, coupled with this individualist pre-
mise, has produced a constitutional bargain in which the government
is restrained from establishing any form of religious orthodoxy. That
fact "singles out" religion, or sets it apart from government in a way
that no other worldview is set apart. However, religion is manifestly
not a "privilege" that benefits believers at the expense of everyone
else. Atheists, agnostics, and other skeptics, no less than believers,
benefit from the constitutional principle stripping the civil magistrate
of power to enforce religious orthodoxy.
Consider the issue of school prayer. Unless religion is somehow
constitutionally special, it would be difficult to justify the ban on vol-
untary school prayer. In school, children are required to recite many
things, from Shakespearean sonnets to the elements in the periodic
table. If atheists are correct, then prayers are nothing but nonsense,
such as like Lewis Carroll's Jaberwocky. What is the injury in being
asked to spout nonsense words? One might respond that religion, un-
like nonsense, is controversial and that the government is wrong in
attempting to impose any particular view. However, religion is not
114. See, e.g., Frederick Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religions, 78 VA. L. REV. 671
(1992); David Caudill, A Calvinist Perspective on the Place of Faith in Legal Scholarship, in




the only subject where schoolchildren are entitled to draw their own
conclusions, or likely to be sensitive to governmental pressure. In
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,' 15 the Court held that it
is unconstitutional for public schools to punish students for refusing to
participate in the flag salute. The majority opinion contained the fol-
lowing broad declaration:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any
circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to
US. 116
As this language suggests, we have a general constitutional principle
against the imposition of orthodoxy with respect to politics, national-
ism, and other matters of opinion, as well as religion. School prayer
fits neatly within this broader category. However, note that the hold-
ing in Barnette went no further than to forbid the punishment of
schoolchildren for not participating in the flag salute. The Court did
not prevent the government from encouraging participation in the flag
salute, and provided no protection against peer pressure or other sub-
tle pressure to conform. On many subjects, such as smoking, absti-
nence, and deciding whether capitalism is a good system, government
schools "prescribe what shall be orthodox" by methods (usually) short
of actual coercion. Imagining a school which did not subscribe to such
a system is impossible. In the School Prayer Cases,1 7 by contrast,
government schools were forbidden from composing or conducting
prayers, although the plaintiffs were not threatened with punishment
for failing to join in on the prayers. That is a very different conclu-
sion, arising from our constitutional tradition that the imposition of a
religious orthodoxy is a more serious affront to liberal values than the
imposition of orthodoxy on other subjects. This concept is a differ-
ence that unbelievers, as well as believers who wish to control the re-
ligious upbringing of their children, presumably celebrate.
3. Religious Freedom as an Inalienable Right and Duty to God
The final, and perhaps the most important, argument for the free-
dom of religion during the formative period was that religious free-
dom was not merely a matter of personal autonomy, but rather, arose
115. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
116. Id. at 642.
117. School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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from the duty of each person to worship God in accordance with the
dictates of conscience. In the key paragraph of his Memorial and Re-
monstrance Against Religious Assessments, James Madison reasoned
as follows:
The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and
conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise
it as these may dictate. This right is in its nature an unalienable
right. It is unalienable, because the opinions of men, depending only
on the evidence contemplated by their own minds cannot follow the
dictates of other men: It is unalienable also, because what is here a
right towards men, is a duty towards the Creator. It is the duty of
every man to render to the Creator such homage and such only as
he believes to be acceptable to him.118
In this argument, Madison drew on several hundred years of dissent-
ing Protestant thought, in which the argument for religious freedom
was developed. 19 William Penn, for example, had written in The
Great Case of Liberty of Conscience:
[W]hosoever shall interpose their authority to enact faith and wor-
ship in a way that seems not to us congruous with what he has dis-
covered to us to be faith and worship (whose alone properly it is to
do it) or to restrain us from what we are persuaded is our indispen-
sable duty, they evidently usurp this authority, and invade [God's]
incommunicable right of government over conscience .... 120
This argument was central to the eventual triumph of disestablishment
and free exercise because it showed that attempts to use government
power to foster religious truth were doomed to failure, and even
worse, were an attempt to usurp the place of God, who was Lord of
the conscience.
Freedom of religion was thus not a claim of personal autonomy, but
rather an allocation of authority between two jurisdictions: the earthly
and the divine. Attempts to coerce religion were an invasion of God's
prerogative. Elisha Williams, a New Light Congregationalist and Rec-
tor of Yale, drew an analogy to one king attempting to govern the
people of another kingdom:
[I]f Christ be the Lord of the conscience, the sole King in his own
kingdom; then it will follow, that all such as in any manner or de-
gree assume the power of directing and governing the consciences
of men, are justly chargeable with invading his rightful dominion;
He alone having the right they claim. Should the king of France
118. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments § 1 (1785),
reprinted in KURLAND & LERNER, supra note 77, at 82.
119. See generally McConnell, First Freedom, supra note 75 at 1245-57.
120. William Penn, The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience, in 2 THE WORKS OF WILLIAM
PENN 135 (London 1726).
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take it into his head to prescribe laws to the subjects of the king of
Great Britain; who would not say, it was an invasion of and insult
offer'd to the British legislature. 121
If believed, this argument explicitly distinguishes religious freedom
from other liberties of the individual, and explains why religion is
"singled out" for special insulation from governmental influence or
control. No other freedom is a duty to a higher authority. Neverthe-
less, can this account of religious freedom be accepted today?
This rationale can most easily be accepted by those who accept the
idea of a divine authority whose demands are, as Madison stated,
"precedent both in order of time and degree of obligation, to the
claims of Civil Society."' 122 This idea may be sufficient in a nation,
such as the United States, where the vast majority of the people be-
lieve in the existence of a God. However, belief in the reality of a
God is not necessary to the argument. An individual needs only to
believe conditionally that if there is a God, this idea can be revealed
only through the "conviction and conscience" of the individual and
not through the hand of the state. Most atheists and agnostics share
that opinion. Indeed, sincere atheists and agnostics are often passion-
ate in the conviction that the force of the state should not be brought
to bear in support of any understanding of religious truth. Moreover,
it is logically possible, indeed humane and praiseworthy, for those
who do not believe in the existence of God, but who recognize that
many of their fellow citizens do, to refrain from using the power of the
state to create conflicts with what are perceived (even if incorrectly)
as divine commands.
We might draw an analogy to citizens of other nations, or to chil-
dren of other parents. When a citizen of another nation is in our
midst, we go out of our way to avoid putting him into a position of
conflict between our ways and loyalty to his own country, not because
we agree with his assessment of the virtues of his own land, but rather,
because we recognize the virtue of patriotism even in a person whose
patria we do not admire. Similarly, if the children of other parents are
in our home, we attempt to avoid situations in which the teachings of
their parents are challenged by the practices of our home. We do not
show movies their parents would disapprove of (even if we disagree),
or serve foods they would not be permitted to eat at home (even if we
think the restrictions are pointless). We give respect to the obligations
121. Elisha Williams, The Essential Rights and Liberties of Protestants (1744), reprinted in Po-
LITICAL SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN FoUNDING ERA 51, 65-66 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 1991).
122. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments § 1 (1785),
reprinted in KURLAND & LERNER, supra note 77, at 82.
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of others to carry out duties to the authorities in their lives, even when
we ourselves do not recognize or agree with those authorities. On this
ground, even those who do not recognize the existence or authority of
a God may well believe that the nation should guarantee the free ex-
ercise of religion.
D. Religion and "Nonreligion"
Much of the confusion on this subject comes from an ambiguity
about what it means to "single out" religion. A common misconcep-
tion is that "religion" is in one category, and everything else, typically
called "nonreligion," is in another category. This conception has been
fueled by the Supreme Court's ill considered, but much quoted, state-
ment in Everson v. Board of Education that the government must be
"neutral between religion and nonreligion." 123 In fact, there is no
identifiable entity that goes by the name of "nonreligion." Rather,
there are an infinite number of ideas, highly disparate among them-
selves, that are not religious. A better conception of "singling out" is
that religion is one of many things that are "singled out" for special
constitutional treatment. Speech, for example, is "singled out" be-
cause claims of harm to others as a result of speech are treated with
far greater skepticism than claims of harm from other activity. "Sticks
and stones may break my bones but words will never hurt me." As a
philosophical or ontological proposition, this is not true: words can
wound. However, for a combination of historical, experiential, and
prudential reasons, we treat speech as if it were special, and tolerate
harms from speech that we would not tolerate from other sources.
The Constitution "singles out" a number of ideas, interests, and
concerns. Among them are property, self-incriminating statements,
punishment, liberty, habeas corpus, ex post facto laws, involuntary
servitude, voting rights, and rights deemed "fundamental." Each of
these examples receives special treatment, though not the same type
of special treatment. The special treatment of each of these matters
can be subjected to skeptical analysis, and a critic can no doubt iden-
tify cases in which it seems arbitrary to accord constitutional protec-
tion to an activity falling within the definition and deny it to a close
analog. (Why should cable television companies have a constitutional
defense against "open access" regulations when natural gas companies
do not?124 Why should teenagers be able to get an abortion without
parental permission when they could not get a heart operation? 125)
123. 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
124. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 644 (1994).
125. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
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Nevertheless, each of these concepts receives special treatment by the
Constitution, and in each case such treatment can be defended by a
combination of philosophical arguments, experiences, prudential judg-
ments, and popular intuitions.
This is the sense in which religion is "singled out." Not in contradis-
tinction to "nonreligion," but rather, as one of a great many human
concerns that are insulated, for a variety of reasons and in a variety of
ways, from the play of democratic politics.
IV. THE INCOHERENCE OF THE THEORY OF "EQUAL REGARD"
As already noted, 126 Professors Eisgruber and Sager have proposed
a theory that justifies substantial protection for religious freedom
while condemning the special place of religion in our constitutional
tradition. They entitle this theory the principle of "equal regard,"
which "requires simply that government treat the deep, religiously in-
spired concerns of minority religious believers with the same regard as
that enjoyed by the deep concerns of citizens generally." 127 Eisgruber
and Sager not only claim that this approach is more consistent with
First Amendment values, but that it will also provide a stronger basis
for principled decision making, in contrast to the traditional "compel-
ling interest" doctrine, which "offers neither conceptual nor practical
guidance for making the compromises necessary to reach an appropri-
ate degree of accommodation for religious interests."'128 "Equal re-
gard," they say, is "normatively attractive, conceptually precise, and
describes a liveable world: a world that accommodates the deep, relig-
iously inspired concerns of minority religious believers to the same
degree as the deep concerns of citizens generally. ' 129
In the end, the theory of "equal regard" does not live up to this
billing. Far from being "conceptually precise" and "liveable," the the-
ory of "equal regard" is deeply incoherent and ultimately meaning-
less. According to the "equal regard" approach, a court in a free
exercise case should ask how other "deep interests" are treated (ei-
ther in reality or as a hypothetical matter), and should insist that relig-
ious interests be treated as well, and no better. However, the answer
to this question depends entirely on the choice of a comparison group.
If the religious claim is compared to the strongest and most powerful
secular analog, then the "equal regard" test is virtually indistinguish-
able from the compelling interest test. Only the most compelling of
126. Eisgruber and Sager, Vulnerability, supra note 43.
127. Id. at 1285.




governmental interests are protected absolutely, with no exceptions.
However, if the religious claim is compared to weak secular analogs, it
will relegate religious interests to second-class status. There is nothing
in "equal regard" theory that guides the choice of comparisons, and in
principle, such a guide cannot exist.
Eisgruber and Sager explain their approach by reference to hy-
potheticals based on Thomas v. Review Board,130 in which a Jehovah's
Witness, named Thomas, was held constitutionally entitled to unem-
ployment compensation after he was discharged for refusal to work on
armaments. Under their theory, the court is obliged to "defer to the
perspective of a religious believer" regarding the importance of his
belief, and is obliged to treat that belief no less favorably than other
claims that are held in highest regard. "The protection of religious
conscience requires that the state treat religious belief as a "black
box"; for purposes of assessing the impact of a sincerely held scheme
of religious belief upon the believer, the ultimate truth or the reasona-
bility of the scheme is beyond the constitutional competence of the
state."' 131 This idea can be entitled Equal Regard Principle Number
One: sincere religious claims must be assumed to be of great
importance.
Now comes the second stage in the analysis, in which Eisgruber and
Sager posit the existence of a "Secular Thomas," 132 identical to the
real Thomas except that his motivations for pacifism are nonreligious.
Eisgruber and Sager maintain, contrary to current law, that "Secular
Thomas" should also receive unemployment compensation. They ar-
gue, without much explanation, that "[a] constitutional jurisprudence
that permitted intervention on behalf of one Thomas but not the other
would be unacceptable. 1' 33 Secular claims of conscience are entitled
to judicial protection, just as religious claims of conscience. This can
be entitled Equal Regard Principle Number Two: it is unacceptable to
treat two claimants differently on the sole ground that the motivation
for the actions of one is religious and the other nonreligious.
Eisgruber and Sager then posit a third worker, who refuses employ-
ment as a replacement worker when the original workers went out on
strike. Surprisingly, they balk at extending "equal regard" to this
worker. The following is Eisgruber and Sager's explanation:
"Secular Thomas" has the stronger case. Even those who justify mil-
itary action usually do so only in the face of great anguish and re-
130. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
131. Eisgruber & Sager, Vulnerability, supra note 43, at 1292.
132. Id. at 1292-93.
133. Id. at 1292.
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gret. The idea of a just war involves high moral stakes and many
imponderables. We may accordingly think it reasonable for "Secular
Thomas" to build his moral life around absolute pacifist principles,
even if we disagree with those principles and even if by doing so
Thomas renders himself incapable of complying with certain public
norms. . . . Labor law issues have, by contrast, a more economic
focus and a less immediate connection to matters of life and death.
The stakes are lower and the imponderables less profound. It is pos-
sible, but not likely, that we would deem union sympathy to be rea-
sonably constitutive of moral identity in the same way that pacifism
is. 134
Does this example violate "equal regard?" No, because the state is
entitled to second-guess the "reasonability" of this worker's aversion
to strikebreaking. Since the secular believer and the state "in princi-
ple share a common epistemic foundation," the state "may legiti-
mately reflect upon and respond to the reasonability of the secular
claimant's conscientious commitments."' 135 Equal regard "does not
guarantee that citizens will be able to honor their moral, social, or
political commitments without politically imposed costs. '136 It would
be "fantastic" to treat all conscientious claims in this way. 137 This idea
can be entitled Equal Regard Principle Number Three: the state is not
obliged to defer to secular claims of conscience, but may honor them,
or not, based on its own assessment of their "reasonability."
To be complete, we should consider a fourth hypothetical: the de-
vout Catholic worker, who out of his understanding of Catholic social
thought with its strong commitment to collective bargaining, 138 refuses
to accept employment as a replacement worker. Since this worker
possesses a religious conviction, hence a "black box," he would be
entitled to unemployment compensation under the Eisgruber-Sager
approach (as well as current law).
At this point we can combine each of the results. The religious paci-
fist receives unemployment benefits (Principle Number One), as well
as the secular pacifist (Principle Number Two). The devout Catholic
who thinks that being a scab would be sinful would also receive bene-
fits (Principle Number One). The secular labor sympathizer, however,
does not receive benefits (Principle Number Three). However, how
does this fact effect Principle Number Two? A religiously-motivated
refusal to engage in strikebreaking would be treated as eligible for
134. Id. at 1293.
135. Id. at 1293.
136. Id. at 1293.
137. Id. at 1293-94.
138. See David L. Gregory, Workers' Rights and Catholic Social Teaching, in CHRISTIAN PER-
SPECIIVES, supra note 114.
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compensation, while a secular refusal, being insufficiently reasonable,
according to Eisgruber and Sager, would not be eligible. If "[a] con-
stitutional jurisprudence that permitted intervention on behalf of one
Thomas but not the other would be unacceptable," 139 then why is it
acceptable for the Catholic union sympathizer to be protected when
the secular union sympathizer is not?
The three parts of the "equal regard" principle are mutually incon-
sistent. If, as Principle Number Three recognizes, the government
must have the latitude to judge the relative weight of secular interests
that conflict with governmental objectives, then it is logically impossi-
ble to use all such interests as the benchmark for "equal regard."
Some secular interests are strong and some are weak. Religious inter-
ests cannot be treated equally with respect to both concepts. To treat
religious claims as equal to the strongest claims is to privilege them
over the weak claims; while treating religious claims as equal to the
weaker claims is to disadvantage them compared to the strong.
The only logical alternative is to extend to all secular claims of con-
science the same high regard that is extended to religious claims of
conscience, without subjecting those claims to an independent exami-
nation as to their "reasonability." Eisgruber and Sager rightly reject
this solution. There are no conceptual stopping points to this
approach:
Need a conscientious commitment be framed in recognizably moral
terms? Does it require a system of belief, or can it be simply a sharp
impulse? Need it involve an element of sacrifice? ... [I]f we
broaden conscience to include a great swath of the deep commit-
ments people hold, we face the fantastic idea that it is a matter of
constitutional regret whenever an otherwise valid law collides with
the commitments of an individual or group.' 40
While it is highly desirable for a liberal state to accommodate claims
of conscience when it can, Eisgruber and Sager are correct that such a
principle cannot be made a matter of constitutional obligation. How-
ever, if this idea is true, then it is not possible to maintain both that
religious commitments are entitled to constitutional protection and
that religious commitments must be treated the same as nonreligious
commitments.
Moreover, this problem extends even to contexts in which all the
members of the relevant comparison group, the analogs to religion,
are treated the same way. In such cases, which Eisgruber and Sager
139. Eisgruber & Sager, Vulnerability, supra note 43, at 1292.
140. Id. at 1268.
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call "flat rule cases,"1 4' one might expect that the principle of "equal
regard" would be the same as the rule in Smith. The situation in
Smith was a "flat rule" case: the consumption of peyote is illegal no
matter what the reason. However, Eisgruber and Sager are not con-
tent with this rationale. In principle, they say, the question should be
whether the state has failed to "take the deep interests" of religious
believers "as seriously as well-recognized secular interests or the inter-
ests of adherents to mainstream religions."'' 42 In the absence of actual
exceptions, that inquiry may proceed on a hypothetical basis, examin-
ing close analogies to form an educated guess about how the govern-
ment would respond if faced with other powerful claims for
exemption. At times, these analogies can be rather far afield. For
example, when determining whether "equal regard" requires Con-
gress to exempt religiously motivated objectors from the social secur-
ity system, Eisgruber and Sager claim that the court is required to
look at evidence such as the fact that Congress has exempted the rit-
ual use of peyote from controlled substance laws, and has enacted a
family leave law to accommodate the burdens of working parents. 43
In Smith, Eisgruber and Sager argue that the Court should have
looked to such statutes such as the exemption of sacramental wine
during prohibition. 44
This example multiplies the problem of indeterminancy that
plagued Eisgruber and Sager's theory in the unemployment compen-
sation cases. If we are consulting hypothetical analogies that are not
tied to the statutory restriction at hand, we can find some in which the
legislature has made accommodations to seemingly minor interests,
and some in which the legislature has failed to make accommodations
even to seemingly powerful and significant interests. Which extreme
shall we choose for our model? If we choose the cases in which the
legislature has made accommodations, and accordingly order a relig-
ious accommodation, then we will have treated religion better than
the less-favored secular analogs. However, if we choose the cases in
which the legislature has not made accommodations, and accordingly
deny the religious accommodation, we will have afforded religion less
than "equal" respect.
141. Id. at 1288.
142. Id. at 1289.
143. Eisgruber & Sager, RFRA, supra note 43, at 459.
144. Eisgruber & Sager, Vulnerability, supra note 43, at 1290. Eisgruber and Sager argue that




In particular, Eisgruber and Sager's proposal seems to suffer the
same flaw that they attribute to the RFRA. In order to be constitu-
tional, Eisgruber and Sager argue that the Act must extend protection
to "comparably serious secular commitments such as those flowing
from parental obligation, philosophical conviction, or lifelong cultural
practice. ' 145 Yet the Eisgruber-Sager approach assumes that all relig-
ious commitments are as powerful and worthy of protection as the
most powerful and worthy of secular commitments. No secular com-
mitment receives such automatic deference. 146 To be fair, Eisgruber
and Sager maintain that the principle of "equal regard" applies to sec-
ular commitments as a matter of legislative responsibility. In other
words, the legislature ought to extend "equal regard" to important
secular commitments, such as parental obligations, philosophical con-
viction, and lifelong cultural practice. 147 However, this idea is not a
legally enforceable obligation. Thus, it seems that Eisgruber and
Sager's theory "privileges" religion no less than, and in the same way
as, the RFRA.
In the end, Eisgruber and Sager refuse to be bound to that the dic-
tum that requires religious concerns to be treated with regard equal
to, but not greater than, that which is extended to comparable secular
concerns. Under their theory, the right of religious concerns to be
treated with "equal regard" is constitutionalized, and thus made a
matter of judicial review. The right of secular concerns to be treated
with "equal regard," however, is merely precatory. Eisgruber and
Sager acknowledge:
Equal regard, of course, is a symmetrical principle, and applies to
secular as well as sectarian concerns. But it does not follow that the
enforcement of equal regard as it applies to secular conscience is
appropriately on the agenda of the judiciary. After all, in principle,
Vincent the artist is entitled to have his deep, artistically inspired
concerns treated by the state with the same regard as that enjoyed
by the deep concerns of citizens generally; but it does not follow
that his entitlement should be judicially enforced as an element of
constitutional doctrine. 148
This statement gives the game away. Religious claimants are entitled
to bring claims in court whenever they believe that a hypothetical sec-
145. Eisgruber & Sager, RFRA, supra note 43, at 453-54.
146. Eisgruber and Sager admit that "the principle of equal regard as it applies to secular
conscience" is not, and should not be, judicially enforceable. Eisgruber & Sager, Vulnerability,
supra note 43, at 1291.
147. For reasons already noted, even as a matter of legislative responsibility, this idea seems
incoherent, since it is literally impossible to treat all human commitments equally. The legisla-
ture will necessarily consider some commitments more worthy than others.
148. Eisgruber & Sager, Vulnerability, supra note 43, at 1291.
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ular interest would be sufficiently weighty to compel an accommoda-
tion. Nonreligious claimants are entitled to the same regard in theory,
but this is not legally enforceable. This idea is very similar to the con-
stitutional doctrine that Eisgruber and Sager are criticizing. A doc-
trine in which the free exercise of religion is given constitutional
protection, and the relative weight given to other important concerns
is relegated to the political sphere.
In short, if the state is free to decide how it will treat various secular
concerns, but is constitutionally constrained regarding its treatment of
religious concerns, there necessarily will be cases in which religion is
"singled out." Not all secular concerns will be treated with "equal
regard," which means that religious concerns will necessarily be
treated better or worse than some secular concerns. "Equal regard" is
a logical impossibility in a legal regime in which the government's re-
lation to religion is treated as a matter of constitutional law, whereas
the government's relation to the secular analogs to religion is not a
constitutional issue. "Equal regard" theory is indeterminate at the
core.
V. A UNIFIED THEORY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
We have established that the special treatment of religion under the
First Amendment is not a form of "privilege," but rather, a compre-
hensive attempt to minimize government power over religious deci-
sions, whether to benefit or inhibit religion, or control and transform
religion. However, it is unclear what approach the courts should take
in order to achieve this ideal in a way that interferes as little as possi-
ble with the legitimate exercise of democratic authority. In order to
resolve this issue, it is necessary to engage in a close analysis of the
nature of government action, the ways in which different forms of
government action can be abused to exert control or influence over
religion, and the relevance of other constitutional norms. The result-
ing array of doctrinal responses is far from settled, but the following is
an outline, in general terms, of the emerging state of constitutional
doctrine.
First, let us consider the regulatory authority of the government, its
power to command or forbid certain forms of conduct. There are two
principal dangers of government control over religious practice:
threats to religiously informed conscience and threats to religious in-
stitutional autonomy. The former is present when the government
takes a normative position contradicting that of a religious group
(usually a minority, since it is unusual for democratic governments to
pass laws embodying normative positions at odds with the major relig-
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ion of the people). An example would be the law in Smith, forbidding
the ingestion of peyote, which is the central sacramental activity of the
Native American Church. 149 The latter is present when the govern-
ment passes laws that affect a religious institution's choice of leaders
or members, its formulation and expression of doctrine, or its internal
structure and discipline. Conflicts of this sort are not typically limited
to minority religions. Examples would include anti-discrimination
laws as applied to clergy selection or historic preservation laws gov-
erning a church's symbolic presentation of itself to the world. In both
categories, the strategy best calculated to reduce governmental con-
trol over religion, while at the same time preserving the government's
latitude to exercise the full police power, is to vest an intermediate
body (the court) with power to require reasonable accommodation of
the religious activity. Under current constitutional interpretation, au-
thority to determine such accommodation in the first instance is pri-
marily legislative.
On the other hand, some exercises of regulatory authority neither
clash with religious normative judgments nor invade the institutional
autonomy of churches, but rather, merely increase the cost of relig-
iously motivated activity. For example, a speed limit might make it
more difficult for a parishioner to attend church. However, such a law
should not be subject to heightened scrutiny. The law makes all travel,
for all purposes, equally more difficult (or, for that matter, equally
safe), with no special effects on religious travel. The burden imposed
by this law on religious exercise is not substantial, because the be-
liever can easily (without injury to conscience or disproportionate ex-
ertion) achieve his religious purposes without violating the law. The
same idea is true of genuinely neutral financial exactions: they may
make it more difficult to devote money to religious purposes, but
neither cause injury to conscience nor a disproportionate burden on
religion.150 Where there is no clash of normative values and no dis-
proportionate impact on religious activity, the law should not require,
and may not even permit, exceptions for religiously motivated activity.
Such laws bear equally on religious and nonreligious activity, and as a
result, there is no need to "single out" religion for special treatment.
Second, let us consider the government's power to tax and spend.
In this situation, the great dangers arise from the government's discre-
tion to engage in selective subsidy: the power to create incentives for
individuals to alter their conduct by providing financial support to one
149. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 872.
150. See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
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choice and not to a substitute. If this discretionary power is the dan-
ger, it makes sense to distinguish between two types of governmental
spending programs: discretionary grants, and grants made pursuant to
neutral, objective formulas. When government officials are accorded
the discretion to grant or deny funds based on their judgments about
the relative worthiness of competing projects, there are great dangers
that the power of the fisc will be used to reward or penalize religious
activity. Accordingly, constitutional doctrine has developed to prevent
such subsidies from flowing to religious activities (though not to sepa-
rable secular components of religious institutions). 151 When subsidies
are distributed according to objective, neutral criteria, by contrast,
there is no substantial danger that this criteria will create incentives to
make particular religious choices. As a result, the Court has approved
the constitutionality of aid that is "allocated on the basis of neutral,
secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and is made
available to both religious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscrimi-
natory basis." 152
Finally, in the context of both regulation and spending, it is neces-
sary to take into consideration other constitutional values that may be
at stake in particular cases. A clear example of this idea is religious
speech. It is undoubtedly true that speech is a component of religious
exercise, however, when a conflict centers on the right of free speech,
the proper result is affected by the content and viewpoint neutrality
requirements of the Free Speech Clause. Thus, whether religious
claimants are seeking special treatment, 53 or seeking equal access to a
public forum or its financial equivalent, 54 the governing principle will
be one of equal treatment, not of accommodation or of separation.
Favoring religious speakers over similarly situated nonreligious speak-
ers would violate the viewpoint-neutrality requirement of the Free
Speech Clause.155
Other constitutional values may lead to similar results. For example,
in cases involving the constellation of constitutional values described
as "privacy," where the central concern is that aspects of life be
151. See Bowen v. Kendrick; 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973);
Michael W. McConnell, Political and Religious Disestablishment, 1986 BYU L. REV. 405, 420-24,
434-40, 456-59.
152. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 231 (1997). Obviously, there are going to be intermedi-
ate cases, where grant officials exercise constrained discretion. These will be hard cases.
153. Such cases are unusual in practice. An example would be the claim that a religious
speaker is entitled to preferred treatment because the speech is mandated by his religion.
154. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819
(1995); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
155. For a more extensive analysis of this issue, see Alan Brownstein, State RFRA Statutes and
Freedom of Speech, 32 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 605 (1999).
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shielded from governmental inquiry or control, it may be necessary to
adopt a religion-blind policy. In such contexts, the very attempt to dis-
tinguish religious from nonreligious motivations would entail govern-
mental inquiry; it is almost certainly better, and may be
constitutionally required, for government to stay out altogether. For
example, parents have a privacy right to control the upbringing of
their children, and thus (in some contexts) to interpose objections to
the intrusions of the state. Within this domain, where the parents are
not required to state their reasons, it would follow that religious rea-
sons must be treated no differently than other reasons. This idea can
be viewed as a species of "equal regard," but it is more accurately an
idea that follows from the values of privacy.
The Supreme Court's emerging jurisprudence, with some excep-
tions, is increasingly oriented toward protecting religious freedom
from government control. With regard to the government's power of
imposing burdens on religious exercise through regulation, the Court
now generally follows three principles. First, the regulatory power is
unconstitutional when it is used to discriminate against religious exer-
cise. 156 Second, regulation pursuant to neutral and generally applica-
ble laws is generally permissible. 57 Third, in the discretion of the
legislature, religious exercise may be exempted from neutral and gen-
erally applicable laws if, but only if, the accommodation is "designed
to alleviate government intrusions that might significantly deter ad-
herents of a particular faith from conduct protected by the Free Exer-
cise Clause," 158 and would not "have the effect of 'inducing' religious
belief."1 59
With regard to the government's power to benefit religion through
subsidies, there are three similar rules. First, the government may not
discriminate in favor of religious recipients. 160 Second, subsidies dis-
tributed pursuant to neutral criteria are generally permissible. 161
Third, any benefit to religion must occur "only as a result of the genu-
inely independent and private choices of individuals."' 162 This implies
that the government may (indeed must) depart from neutrality if, but
only if, the neutral scheme does not advance the objective of ensuring
that religious judgments are the product of genuinely independent and
private choice.
156. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
157. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
158. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 18 n.8 (1989).
159. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. at 727 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
160. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 8.
161. Agostini, 520 U.S. at 234.
162. Id. at 226.
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Thus, whether the government is burdening or benefitting religion,
the general principle is the same. Neutral and generally applicable
laws are generally permissible, however, special treatment of religion
is justified where this would ensure that religious judgments are the
result of private judgment. The primary difference is that, after Smith,
religious accommodations from regulatory power are mostly left to
the legislature, while neutral and generally available subsidy programs
are subject to judicial review, under which courts may insist on special
treatment of religion when necessary to ensure that private choice
prevails.
VI. USING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM As A MODEL
As discussed above, much of the difficulty of this question is created
by the supposed dichotomy between religion and "nonreligion," when
in fact religion bears resemblances to, and has differences from, a
wide variety of other human concerns.
Religion is a special phenomenon, in part, because it plays such a
wide variety of roles in human life: it is an institution, but it is more
than that; it is an ideology or worldview, but it is more than that; it is a
set of personal loyalties and locus of community, akin to family ties,
but it is more than that; it is an aspect of identity, but it is more than
that; it provides answers to questions of ultimate reality, and offers a
connection to the transcendent; but it is more than that. Religion can-
not be reduced to a subset of any larger category. In any particular
context, religion may appear to be analogous to some other aspect of
human activity - to another institution, worldview, personal loyalty,
basis of personal identity, or answer to ultimate and transcendent
questions. However, there is no other human phenomenon that com-
bines all of these aspects; if there were such a concept, it would proba-
bly be viewed as a religion.
Thus, a rigid insistence that religion be treated the same as "nonreli-
gion," or the same as a secular analog, is pointless and incoherent.
There is no single entity that meets the description of "nonreligion"
and there will always be more than one secular analog. However, this
idea does not mean that religion is always and necessarily sui generis.
There are important ways in which the experience of dealing with
questions of religious freedom may be applicable to other areas of
cultural conflict. Religion was the deepest source of disagreement
among the people with which our Founders were familiar. Our
Founding society reflected on the problem of religious difference in a
deep and serious way, and developed a strategy to enable men and
women of diverse commitments to live together peacefully, as free
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and equal citizens, with the least injury to their consciences and con-
victions, consistent with the necessary purposes of civil government.
Rather than treat this solution as an anomaly, or worse yet, to decon-
struct it in order to ensure that religion not be accorded a "privileged"
status in our society, we should learn from the idea.
The separation of church and state should be a model for separating
public from private in other areas. The separation of church and state
is not only about church. It is about the idea that the government is
not omnicompetent. Government is created by the people for defined
and limited ends. The most striking feature of our religious settlement
is the adoption of two constitutional proscriptions, which, though in
the service of a single objective, look in opposite directions, toward
opposite threats. The free exercise principle "singles out" religion for
special protection against governmental hostility or interference. The
disestablishment principle prevents the government from using its
power to promote, advocate, or endorse any particular religious posi-
tion. These principles balance people's interests in competing, and in-
deed antithetical, views, and thus achieve a type of neutrality. Rather
than assuming this settlement is confined to religion, thus creating the
"singling out" problem, it would be helpful to think of religion as the
core, or paradigm, for the treatment of other problems of cultural and
conscientious conflict, where we wish to guarantee a wide scope for
individual and private collective cultural and conscientious diversity,
without putting the government in the position of advocating or en-
dorsing any particular orthodoxy.
I do not mean to suggest that doctrines developed for the treatment
of religious difference can be mechanically imposed on other areas of
cultural conflict. There are differences, which often require differ-
ences in treatment. Nor do I mean that courts are entitled to use the
Religion Clauses as a basis for overturning democratic judgments
outside the field of religion. However, I do mean that the Religion
Clauses can be used as a starting point for dealing with other types of
difference, as a matter of policy, sometimes of law, and even, occa-
sionally, as a matter of constitutional doctrine under other provisions
of the Constitution.
Let us consider several examples of cultural and conscientious con-
flict in our society. First, the disputes surrounding sexual orienta-
tion. 163 As in the case of religious conflict, these disputes feature a
163. The following is a summary of an argument I present at greater length in Michael W.
McConnell, What Would It Mean To Have a "First Amendment" For Sexual Orientation?, in
SEXUAL ORIENTATION & HUMAN RIGHTS IN AMERICAN RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE (Saul M. Olyan
& Martha Nussbaum eds., 1998).
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seemingly irreconcilable clash between those who believe that homo-
sexual conduct is immoral and those who believe that it is a natural
and morally unobjectionable manifestation of human sexuality. For
the most part, our current debates are mutually intolerant: one side
seeks to use the force of law to maintain the traditional moral stance
against homosexual conduct, while the other wishes to use law to
change social attitudes and bring about full social acceptance of ho-
mosexuality. An analogy to the Religion Clauses, however, suggests
an alternative.
The starting point would be to extend respect to both sides in the
conflict of opinion, to treat both the view that homosexuality is a
healthy and normal manifestation of human sexuality and the view
that homosexuality is unnatural and immoral as conscientious posi-
tions, worthy of respect, much as we treat both atheism and faith as
worthy of respect. In using the term "respect," I do not mean agree-
ment. Rather, I mean the civil toleration we extend to fellow citizens
and fellow human beings even when we disagree with their views. We
should recognize that the "Civil Magistrate" is no more "competent a
Judge" of the "Truth" about human sexuality than about religion.
Under this approach, the state should not impose a penalty on prac-
tices associated with or compelled by any of the various views of ho-
mosexuality, and should refrain from using its power to favor,
promote, or advance one position over the other. The difference be-
tween a "gay rights" position and a "First Amendment" approach is
that the former adopts as its governing principle the idea that homo-
sexuality is normal, natural, and morally unobjectionable, while the
latter takes the view that the moral issue is not for the government to
decide. Thus, the government would not punish sexual acts by con-
senting gay individuals, nor would it use sexual orientation as a basis
for classification or discrimination, without powerful reasons, not
grounded in moral objections, for taking such action. On the other
hand, the government would not attempt to project this posture of
moral neutrality onto the private sphere, but would allow private
forces in the culture to determine the ultimate social response. Moreo-
ver, the government would not use its power over public schools or
other cultural resources to propagate opinion, one way or the other,
on the moral question, but would self-consciously leave the business
of opinion formation on this matter to the private sphere. Such an
approach would produce many of the same advantages for this cul-
tural conflict that the First Amendment produces for religious conflict.
This approach would provide the basis for civic peace on an issue
where the nation is dangerously divided, it would provide maximum
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respect for individual conscience, it would depoliticize an issue that
many of us believe is private and not political in character, and it
would help to restore the public-private distinction.
A second sphere of cultural conflict that would bear comparison to
the Religion Clauses is that of public support for art, together with
attendant controls. In this context, there is no serious question re-
garding the rights of artists to control their artistic expression, free of
government censorship. The issues arise from government subsidies.
Congress has established the NEA, which makes grants to various art-
ists and artistic institutions, and has imposed certain restrictions on
what kinds of art can be funded. 164 Spokespersons for the "arts com-
munity" typically support the subsidies, but oppose the restrictions on
First Amendment grounds.
The analogy to the Religion Clauses would suggest that these two
positions are in tension. A program of selective subsidies for artists,
based on a government agency's evaluation of artistic merit, necessa-
rily encroaches on artistic freedom. (The effect is magnified by the
fact that other donors are said to regard NEA support as an imprima-
tur of artistic quality.) Imagine the creation and operation of a Na-
tional Endowment for Religion, which would make grants to clergy
and religious institutions on the basis of its evaluation of religious
merit. Obviously such a system is incompatible with true artistic (or
religious) freedom. Although the courts can interfere to prevent overt
viewpoint discrimination, it is not possible, in the context of discre-
tionary grants, to guarantee full artistic freedom.
The only way in which government subsides can be provided to art
(or religion) without endangering artistic (or religious) autonomy is
through the medium of nondiscretionary programs based on the indi-
vidual decisions of private actors, such as tax deductible contributions
under the tax code or indirect subsidies through private beneficiaries.
Otherwise, it is necessary for us to choose between a certain vision of
untrammeled artistic freedom and the notion that the government has
a strong role to play in selecting and funding worthy art.
A third possible area for analogizing Religion Clauses doctrine to
nonreligious analogs concerns freedom of association. Presently, pri-
vate noncommercial associations enjoy substantial autonomy under
the common law of voluntary associations. However, the constitu-
tional protections accorded to such associations appears minimal.
Under Roberts v. United States Jaycees,165 the state is said to have a
164. See National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
165. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
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compelling interest in regulating the membership qualifications of
such a group. Boy Scouts v. Dale 66 is a hopeful move in this direction,
but the contours of the associational freedom recognized in that deci-
sion are not yet clear. In contrast, a religious voluntary association
enjoys the freedom to control its own membership and leadership cri-
teria. My suggestion would be to extend the free exercise doctrine
more broadly, as a matter of freedom of association. The Jaycees case
itself might be an exception; as essentially a business networking or-
ganization, the state may have a stronger than usual interest in regu-
lating the Jaycees in order to ensure equal access to economic
opportunity. However, most private noncommercial groups should be
allowed to constitute and govern themselves.
Other examples in which such analogies might be helpful include:
the English-only movement, the use of public schools to engage in
nonreligious indoctrination, and the subsidy and governance of politi-
cal parties. In each of these areas, we should consider the possibility
that a civil libertarian regime based on analogy to the Religion
Clauses would be superior to the current policy. The Religion Clauses
are the most highly articulated doctrinal field devoted to protection of
an area of life from governmental control. They are, in a sense, the
most classically liberal features of our constitutional tradition. In
other areas in which we value pluralism, diversity, and private order-
ing, we should consider structuring the legal regime on an analogy to
the dual protection of free exercise and nonestablishment.
VII. CONCLUSION
In a constitutional system that contains a separate provision gov-
erning relations between government and "religion," it is inevitable
that religion will, at least sometimes, be "singled out" for treatment
not accorded nonreligious institutions or activities. Neither the theory
of religion-blindness, nor that of "equal regard," can make sense of
our constitutional commitment. Both theories posit the treatment of
nonreligious commitments as a benchmark for the treatment of relig-
ious commitments. However, since the various nonreligious commit-
ments of our society are themselves treated with unequal regard, it is
not logically possible to achieve an equality of regard between each
secular concept and religion.
Nonetheless, as the most highly articulated constitutional doctrine
insulating a sphere of human life from governmental control, the Re-
ligion Clauses offer a promising standpoint for constructing and ana-
166. 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
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lyzing the legal arrangements between government and other aspects
of human life that we believe should not be subject to majoritarian
control. Rather than insisting that religious concerns receive no more
protection than is accorded nonreligious analogs, it may be more help-
ful to think of ways in which the twin protections of free exercise and
nonestablishment could be extended to nonreligious spheres of life.
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